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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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**Closing the Gap between the Department of State and U. S. Military Operations during
Post-War Conflict**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

During current and recent U. S. military operations there has not been a seamless transition from phase III (Dominate) to phase IV (Stabilize). This paper argues the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should permanently assign a team of reconstruction and stabilization experts to the Ground Component Commander within a combatant command. It discusses current interagency cooperation, the importance of the planning process and current initiatives the State Department is taking to close the gap with the U. S. military during reconstruction and stabilization operations in post-war conflict. Finally, the paper concludes that a team of reconstruction and stabilization experts should be permanently assigned to the Ground Component Commander. It makes recommendations on where to assign these teams and further research that could be done to help define and develop this team of experts.

Weak and failed states pose a serious security challenge for the United States and the international community. They can become breeding grounds for terrorism, weapons proliferation, trafficking in humans and narcotics, organized crime, and humanitarian catastrophes. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in or contributed significant resources to more than 17 reconstruction and stabilization operations. And the challenge persists. RAND recently reported that in this same time period, the pace of U.S. military interventions has risen to about one every two years. If the U.S. Government is going to meet these threats, we must adapt our national security architecture.

John E. Herbst¹

Coordinator for Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization

Introduction

During recent and past U. S. military operations there has not been a seamless transition from high intensity conventional military operations to reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The State Department established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July of 2004 to improve transition.² The mission of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is focused on improving State Department organizational capacity to effectively conduct post-conflict operations. To do this it is chartered to lead and improve coordination within the Department of Defense in the planning and execution of reconstruction and stabilization in transition from conventional operations. Within the charter it aims to more effectively stabilize, bring peace and develop market economy.³ Currently the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has approximately 90 interagency staff personnel.⁴ With such a broad mission statement, and given numerous reconstruction and stabilization missions on going world-wide, 90 personnel does not seem like enough capacity to achieve

¹ U. S. Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 3-07 (Washington, D. C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 6 October 2008), B-1.

² State Department, "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization," <http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm> (accessed 3 April 2009).

³ Ibid

⁴ Ibid

reconstruction and stabilization objectives in Iraq or Afghanistan. Realizing the importance of reconstruction and stabilization efforts in both countries, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 on December 7, 2005.⁵ “The purpose of the Directive is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”⁶ The directive outlines the responsibilities of the Department of State to plan for and execute reconstruction and stabilization operations. The directive specifically tasks the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate planning with the military to facilitate execution of reconstruction and stability across the spectrum of conflict. The focus of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is to plan and prepare for improving internal security, to improve governance, and social and economic well being as well as reconciling justice in the aftermath of conventional operations.⁷

Starting at the Presidential level there has been a constant emphasis on the coordination of reconstruction and stabilization efforts during operations across the range of military operations. Government and military officials at the highest levels understand the need for closely tied interagency operations to be successful, but it is an extremely challenging task. In September of 2004, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace highlighted the difficulty the military experiences in trying to defeat terrorism with the use of forces alone. He suggests that a combined effort between multiple U. S.

⁵ *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, (7 December 2005), <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html> (accessed 20 March 2009).

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Ibid

agencies is required.⁸ During a speech at Georgetown University on January 18, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice addressed the critical role of post-conflict coordination for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U. S. in the past and currently lacks the civilian capacity to conduct post-war conflict operations. Due to this lack of personnel the U. S. military, specifically the Ground Component have been tasked to conduct post-war conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations.⁹ During these reconstruction and stabilization efforts the Ground Component Commander has been the main entity assisting in the execution of these operations. In a speech on 26 November 2007, in Manhattan, Kansas, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted the need for more than just military success on the battlefield to ensure U. S. success in Iraq and Afghanistan. The State Department must work closely with military ground commanders during all phases of operations setting the conditions for reconstruction and stabilization operations that if conducted properly will ensure long-term success and achieve U. S. strategic level objectives.¹⁰ The Presidential Directive and statements from the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all emphasize the need for interagency cooperation during post war conflict in order to stabilize unstable regions, and thereby reducing the security threat to the United States. They also address the issue of how the U. S. military is taking on the responsibilities of reconstruction and stabilization efforts and that there needs to be more interagency cooperation to lessen the burden on our military. The thesis of this

⁸Jim Garamone, "Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act." *Defenselink.mil*, 7 September 2004, <http://defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25384> (accessed 20 March 2009).

⁹Janet Beik, *Developing the United States Government's Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization: A Work in Progress*, Washington, D.C.: Department of the State, March 2007, 1

¹⁰Robert M. Gates, "Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power" *Military Review*, no. 1 (January-February 2008), 4.

paper is: The State Department office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should permanently integrate teams of reconstruction experts at the Ground Component Commander level within combatant commands in order to better facilitate joint force reconstruction and stability efforts in a post-war conflict environment.

This paper will discuss the importance of permanently integrating teams of reconstruction and stabilization experts with the Ground Component Commander at combatant commands. It will discuss the current lack of interagency cooperation between the State Department, specifically the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the Department of Defense. It will then discuss the planning expertise required to transition from phase III (Dominate) to phase IV (Stabilize) of a U. S. military operation. Finally it discusses the initiatives the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization plans to implement to close the gap between the State Department and U. S. military operations during post-conflict operations. Conclusions and recommendations are also provided.

Interagency Cooperation

During a speech in 2004 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace discussed issues with the lack of interagency cooperation. He stated that the current interagency process lacks unity of effort, there is no synchronization between the interagencies and there is no synergy oriented on U. S. objectives.¹¹ Once orders and directives are issued to key agencies, they work in a vacuum, failing to jointly support one another.¹² Getting the different agencies to interact to achieve U. S. strategic, operational and tactical objectives can be a difficult task. The U. S. lost its strong government civilian

¹¹ Jim Garamone, "Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act."

¹² Ibid

capability it maintained during the Vietnam conflict, due to military and civilian cutbacks.¹³ Today the U. S. lacks sufficient civilian capacity to conduct complex operations; “those operations that require close civil-military planning and cooperation in the field.”¹⁴ With the cutback of personnel, the State Department was under sourced and understaffed. They were not able to hire and assign the number of Foreign Service Officers needed to fill the number of posts required.¹⁵

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, “We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power.”¹⁶ This type of warfare is not conventional and clearly makes the argument for integrated military and interagency planning to complete these complex operations on the battlefield. “Complex operations can be broken into six mission categories restore and maintain security, promote effective governance, conduct reconstruction, sustain economic development, support reconciliation, and foster social change.”¹⁷ Of the six mission categories only one (restore and maintain security) is the primary responsibility of the U. S. military, categories two through six and their associated tasks are recommended to be assigned too and completed by civilian experts.¹⁸ With the lack of civilian expertise to handle all the various missions and tasks, the ones best suited for civilian experts will be handled by the military. U. S. efforts should synchronize the use of limited civilian expert assets such as reconstruction and stabilization experts. The teams of experts permanently

¹³ Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, ed, “Civilian Surge Key to Complex Operations,” (Preliminary Report, National Defense University, December 2008), v

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Robert M. Gates, “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power”, 6

¹⁷ Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, ed, “Civilian Surge Key to Complex Operations”, 5

¹⁸ Ibid

assigned to the Ground Component Commanders staff could therefore provide planning and execution guidance and expertise allowing the military to better accomplish various assigned tasks outside their normally assigned missions.

“General Tommy Franks, Commander of U. S. Central Command made it clear that when he planned for the Iraq invasion he only planned the invasion, not for post-conflict operations.”¹⁹ Post-conflict operations were left to civilians reporting to the Department of Defense that was under-manned and under-resourced.²⁰ Without a prepared and integrated civilian reconstruction and stabilization effort integrated early in the planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coupled with a U. S. military force that had not planned for post-conflict operations, there was going to be a huge gap between the end of phase III (Dominate) operations and phase IV (Stabilize). Absent a combined Department of Defense and State Department integrated planning effort through all phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U. S. military, specifically the Ground Component Commander, would be tasked with leading reconstruction and stabilization efforts. This is an example of the vacuum planning and execution mentality highlighted earlier by General Pace. Once it came to planning phase IV, the military planned for civilian interagency personnel to execute this phase. With a lack of resources and personnel the designated civilian interagency personnel within the Department of Defense could not properly address the reconstruction and stabilization efforts. This gap allowed terrorist and insurgents to exploit the transition from phase III to phase IV as the U. S. military lost valuable time adapting to reconstruction and stabilization operations.

¹⁹ Ibid, vi

²⁰ Ibid

The Ground Component Commanders did the best job they could with the personnel and resources available. Teams of reconstruction experts that were permanently assigned to the Ground Force Commander would help to alleviate some of the challenges associated with the transition from phase III to phase IV. This could reduce duplicate planning and effort during the reconstruction and stabilization that take place during the transition between phase III and IV during Operation Iraqi Freedom post conflict operations. NSPD-44 outlines the objectives for interagency reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The Secretary of State is responsible for synchronizing reconstruction and stabilization efforts for any planned or ongoing U. S. military operations with the Department of Defense. Through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the State Department will ensure planning and implementation of all reconstruction and stabilization programs during all phases of military operations and contingency plans.²¹

Planning Expertise in Phase IV (Stabilize)

Arguably the most difficult and complex phase of any military operation is phase IV (Stabilize) in which the primary activities are to establish security and restore services.²² “Operations during phase IV of a campaign or operation and most stability operations are very complex and require extensive planning and coordination with non-DOD organizations, with military in support of other agencies.”²³ This phase of military operations is so complex that it should require the most coordination during the planning and execution phase. If the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization permanently assigned a team

²¹ *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, (7 December 2005), <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>, (accessed 20 March 2009).

²² Chairman, U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, (Washington, D. C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006), I-17

²³ Ibid

of experts to the Ground Component Commander, this could facilitate the planning and execution. As stated by General Pace: “The military can defeat the enemy on the battlefield, but that is not enough.”²⁴ This team of experts could be the interagency link providing the necessary level of expertise on reconstruction efforts to the ground commander. Currently the military has done its best to tackle phase IV operations, using whatever resources and experienced personnel available, but it is not a replacement for experts that specialize in reconstruction operations. Defense Secretary Robert Gates talks about important lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. The U. S. military, specifically the Ground Component Commanders have taken on the burden of reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U. S., specifically the State Department, through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, needs to continue to develop a civilian capability to assist the U. S. military in planning and executing reconstruction and stabilization operations.²⁵

The underlying theme in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization’s new Interagency Management System is the need for coordinated planning. NSPD-44 highlights the requirements for senior U. S. officials, experts, and support personnel to participate in military planning, exercises and war games all in an effort to remove stovepipes between agencies.²⁶ While one could argue that the Interagency Management System is going to perform the tasks that are outlined above from NSPD-44, the other could argue that the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

²⁴ Jim, Garamone, Jim. “Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act.”

²⁵ Robert M. Gates, “Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power”, 4

²⁶ *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, (7 December 2005), <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html> (accessed 20 March 2009).

is challenged to execute these tasks with a military command if they are only assigned temporarily and not as a permanent member of the Ground Component Commanders staff.

The U. S. military has a very methodical and detailed joint planning process that has been refined over the years. In the military officers, complete Professional Military Education (PME) intermediate level schools designed to instruct them in doctrine and planning. Depending on the service, most officers will not attend this level of PME until they are field grade officers with anywhere from 10 to 15 years of service. This ensures the officers are well rounded and competent. After this education, officers can go on to work as planners on the Ground Component Commanders staff. With the complexity of phase IV operations, a permanently assigned team of reconstruction and stabilization experts could learn and be fully integrated into this complex and detailed planning process from day one. This would also help to facilitate a better transition from phase III to phase IV.

Integrating a team of reconstruction and stabilization experts would also ensure integrated planning during all phases of military planning and execution of contingency plans and major operations. This team of experts being permanently attached could enable them to begin planning at the onset of any operation, allowing them to provide vital input and planning expertise in reconstruction and stabilization operations. Therefore, Ground Component Staff's would understand what assets were necessary and those assets could be prepared and available. This would also allow the team of experts to conduct liaison with other Government agencies such as the U. S. Agency for International Development. This could ensure that they were prepared and understand the requirements required to accomplish their objectives during post conflict operations.

The Ground Component Commander is the commander that has traditionally executed phase IV operations, even if they had not planned for phase IV. This is why the team of experts would integrate specifically with the Ground Component Commander. The Ground Component Commander also is most likely to have control over the U. S. military forces that carry out reconstruction and stabilization operations in the absence, or along with civilian expertise. Permanently assigning this team would allow them to better integrate with their U. S. military counterparts. By working closely together on a daily basis, this could ensure greater trust and understanding of one another's capabilities and expertise in order to accomplish reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Closing the Gap

Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates stated, "We need to develop a permanent, sizeable cadre of immediately deployable experts with disparate skills, a need that President Bush called for in his 2007 State of the Union address, and which the State Department is now working on with its initiative to build a civilian response corps."²⁷ The following are the initiatives the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has taken to achieve the President's objective. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization instituted a new organization for reconstruction and stability operations called the "Interagency Management System."²⁸ The Interagency Management System is designed to integrate reconstruction and stabilization experts at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of U. S. military planning and operations dealing with post-war conflicts. The Interagency Management System should ensure coordination and assist U. S. military and

²⁷ Robert M. Gates, "Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power", 7

²⁸ John E. Herbst, "Statement," *House, Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Learning from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Experience: Statement before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations*, 30 October 2007, <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/94379.htm>

civilian personnel in managing and dealing with post-war conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations in the field and at higher headquarters.²⁹

The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group will be headquartered in Washington to coordinate planning and policies at the strategic level. This group would serve as the liaison between reconstruction and stabilization teams at the Ground Component Commander level. They would also coordinate all U. S. Government planning and execution of reconstruction and stabilization operations between Government agencies that will provide support and assistance to reconstruction and stabilization efforts. This group is also tasked to ensure all efforts are mutual and agencies are not stovepipe planning, duplicating personnel and resource efforts.³⁰

An Integration Planning Cell could provide reconstruction and stabilization expertise at the operational level, these teams could deploy to the U. S. Ground Component Commander as required. This planning cell would consist of a team of experts that would provide planning guidance, country expertise and functional expertise to the Ground Component Commander. These planning cells would vary in number of personnel as well as deployment timeline. They would provide liaison to subordinate tactical teams as well as liaison to the Reconstruction and Stabilization Group in Washington. Of specific interest is the estimated timeframe the cell would stay at the combatant commander's headquarters, one to six months, no longer.³¹ This timeframe would not allow much continuity with the combatant commands staff. Since the planning cell is not permanently assigned to the Ground Component Commander they would most likely not answer to the combatant

²⁹ Janet Beik, *Developing the United States Government's Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization: A Work in Progress*, 2

³⁰ Ibid, 3

³¹ Ibid, 3

commander, and their direction from Washington may not be exactly synchronized with the commanders for whom the cells are assigned. Permanently assigning a team of experts might allow for stronger forged relationships with the Ground Component Commanders staff. This would also provide continuity and facilitate better command and control of the team allowing the commander more flexibility.

An Advance Civilian Team would execute reconstruction and stabilization plans at the tactical level in support of post-war conflict operations. These teams of experts would be able to rapidly deploy and would provide U. S. military tactical level commanders with reconstruction and stabilization planning and field operation expertise. These teams could assist the military commander in employing and organizing his reconstruction and stabilization efforts.³²

The concept behind the Interagency Management System is that it would provide reconstruction and stabilization experts from across U. S. Government agencies. This would enable U. S. military commanders at all levels of operations, an increased capability to accomplish their objectives by better synchronizing interagency activities in time, space, and force.³³

The Interagency Management System has yet to be staffed and implemented into service, but this is a step in the right direction. Permanently assigned teams to the Ground Component Commander would facilitate better continuity, planning and execution throughout reconstruction and stabilization efforts during post-conflict operations. This could also allow personnel on these permanent teams to learn the joint military planning process, in order to make them more efficient and well rounded problem solvers. A team that

³² Ibid, 3-4

³³ Ibid, 4

only deploys or supports the Ground Component Commander might not be as versed in the planning process as a team that is permanently attached.

Conclusion

From NSPD-44: “The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.”³⁴ With multiple on going operations that require large reconstruction and stabilization operations to ensure mission success, it makes sense to assign permanent teams of experts in reconstruction and stabilization operations to the Ground Component Commanders who have shouldered the heavy burden of completing these complex operations.

The President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have continually discussed and stated the need for interagency cooperation. This paper concluded there is a requirement for a permanent team of reconstruction experts assigned to the Ground Component Commanders within their combatant commands. Phase IV is the most complex phase as previously stated from U. S. doctrinal publications, this is why the State Department and Department of Defense must focus on interagency cooperation during this phase. A permanent team could assist in the planning for this phase between the State Department and Department of Defense. This could help to ensure that limited resources and assets are focused in the right areas and valuable time is not wasted transitioning from phase III to phase IV.

³⁴ *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, (7 December 2005), <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>, (accessed 20 March 2009).

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has yet to stand-up the Interagency Management System, but has outlined what they think the structure of the system should look like. They address integrating experts in reconstruction and stabilization at the tactical, operational and strategic level. The teams of experts assigned to the Ground Component Commander would not be permanent in this structure and would only be available to the commander for one to six months. A permanently assigned team of experts would better facilitate the needs of the Ground Component Commander, throughout the entire process of any contingency plan, major operation or training evolution. This could greatly improve the joint coordination effort.

Since steps are currently being taken by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization the counter-argument could be made that a team of experts does not need to be permanently assigned to the Ground Component Commander. The Interagency Management System will facilitate interagency cooperation, ensuring synchronized planning and execution takes place. Since the Integration Planning Cell and Advance Civilian Teams are not permanently assigned it allows the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization greater flexibility to control the teams and their employment. The State Department could also save money by creating fewer teams since they will not be permanently assigned. The argument could also be made since the teams are not permanently assigned, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization could organize the team to the specific mission.

Recommendations

The Department of Defense and the State Department have yet to adequately establish reconstruction and stability capabilities at the Ground Component Commander level in order

to better synchronize interagency cooperation during planning and execution during U. S. military operations.³⁵ A permanently integrated team of reconstruction experts at the Ground Component Commander level within combatant commands would better facilitate joint force reconstruction efforts in a post-war conflict environment. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should permanently integrate their proposed Integration Planning Cell at the Ground Component Commander level. This would not be difficult and would provide for better continuity, planning, and execution of complex operations during phase IV. With the size and diversity of organizations within our Federal Government officials and agencies tend to lose their focus on unity of effort.³⁶ Permanently assigning this team to the Ground Component Commander would greatly increase unity of effort during reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Since it is unlikely that the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization could immediately stand up enough teams for every Ground Component Commander at one time, the following prioritization is recommended initially. The first command that should get a team is Central Command, due to ongoing post high intensity conflict U. S. military operations. The second team would be allocated to African Command, due to the number of states that are categorized in the alert zone (critical), which indicates they could be close to failure.³⁷ The European Command would then receive the third team, due to the fact that it has several regions in its area of operation that border hostile areas. The

³⁵ U. S. Government Accountability Office, Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations, Report to Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, (Washington, D. C.: 30 October 2007 GAO-08228T.) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08228.pdf> (accessed 20 March 2009), 3

³⁶ Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, ed, "Civilian Surge Key to Complex Operations", 19

³⁷ "Failed States Index 2008," *Foreign Policy*, No. 167 (July-August 2008), <http://foreignpolicy.com/images/fs2008/failedstatesranking.jpg> (accessed 29 April 2009).

fourth team would then be assigned to Pacific Command, to help deal with operations dealing with disasters and rebuilding efforts.

This research paper addresses only a small portion on the subject of permanently assigning reconstruction and stabilization experts to the Ground Component Commander. There are many more questions that can be researched and analyzed. How many personnel would be assigned to this team of reconstruction and stabilization experts, what fields of expertise would be required, would different geographic areas require different structure to the teams or would one structure fit every requirement. How would command relationships of the team between the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization work? What kind of personnel would the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization want to look for, civilians with government experience, prior military personnel or prior military officers that have planning experience. How would the Interagency Management System become integrated? Would it be phased in or would the State Department try to stand it all up at once? Would civilian experts get the opportunity to attend any of the U. S. military resident Intermediate Level Schools to receive a better education in the Joint Planning Process?

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